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Hold or sell?
How capital gains taxation affects holding decisions
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Abstract: Investments with exit flexibility require decisions regarding both the investment
and holding period. Because selling an investment often leads to taxable capital gains, which
crucially depend on the duration of an investment, we investigate the impact of capital gains
taxation on exit timing under different tax systems. We observed that capital gains taxation
delays exit decisions but loses its decision relevance for very long holdings. Often the optimal
exit time, which indicates the maximal present value of future cashflows, cannot be deter-
mined analytically. However, we identify the breakeven exit time that guarantees present
values exceeding those of an immediate sale. While, after-taxes, an immediate sale is often
optimal, long holding periods might also be attractive for investors depending on the de-
gree of income and corporate tax integration. A classic corporate tax system often indicates
holdings over more than 100 periods. By contrast, a shareholder relief system indicates the
earliest breakeven exit time and thus the highest level of exit timing flexibility. Surprisingly,
high retention rates are likely to accelerate sales under a classic corporate system. Addition-
ally, the worst exit time, which should be avoided by investors, differs tremendously across
tax systems. For an integrated tax system with full imputation, the worst time is reached
earlier than under partial or non-integrated systems. These results could help to predict in-
vestors’ behavior regarding changes in capital gains taxation and thus are of interest for both
investors and tax policymakers. Furthermore, the results emphasize the need to control for
the underlying tax system in cross-country empirical studies.
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1 Introduction
Entrepreneurial investments are characterized not only by decisions to undertake
an investment but also by the holding period. Taxes are well known to be impor-
tant parameters of the institutional environment of investments (for an overview, see
Shackelford and Shevlin 2001; Graham 2008; Hundsdoerfer et al. 2008; Hanlon and
Heitzman 2010). Taxes on both the corporate and shareholder levels can significantly
affect investment and divestment decisions. Specifically, selling an investment often
produces capital gains, inducing capital gains taxes that are anticipated by investors.
Capital gains taxes are well-known to induce lock-in effects (Constantinides 1983), thus
impeding exits. Capital gains are often due to retained earnings; hence, they crucially
depend on the duration of an investment. Because the duration of an investment can
affect its after-tax profitability, we investigate the impact of capital gains taxation on
the holding period. The relevance of the holding period in investment decisions was
emphasized by Alles and Murray (2009), who found a significant impact of holding pe-
riods on investment performance for different asset classes, and Cheng et al. (2010),
who built on prior empirical studies and theoretically showed that the decision about
the time to sell is crucial for real estate investments and their performance. Against
this background, the following research questions arise: When should an investor di-
vest? To what extent does capital gains taxation affect exit decisions? Because prior
theoretical research has indicated that the manner in which capital gains taxes are em-
bedded in the overall tax system is crucial for their impact on investment (König and
Wosnitza 2000; Schreiber and Rogall 2000; Sureth and Langeleh 2007), we distinguish
among three tax systems that differ in the degree of the integration of corporate-level
taxes into income taxation. To what extent does the underlying tax system impact the
effect of capital gains taxation on the holding period? No studies to date have analyt-
ically addressed the impact of capital gains taxation in different tax environments on
holding periods. We want to fill this gap, and we focus on both different tax systems,
including capital gains taxes and tax rate differentials, and on the impact of retention
policy.
We take the investor’s point of view and focus on investment in corporate shares.
After an initial investment, the investor receives dividends and/or capital gains in
subsequent periods. In addition to, or alternatively by, investing in a corporation,
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the investor can invest in the capital market and earn interest. Interest, dividends,
and capital gains are all considered capital income, but they are typically subject to
different tax rules, e.g., different tax scales. We assume symmetric taxation of capi-
tal gains and losses. Consequently, profits are subject to the profit tax rate. Losses
are tax-deductible at the same tax rate. We focus on the variable “time of sale” to
analyze whether the investment becomes more or less profitable under a classic cor-
porate tax system, a full imputation tax system or a shareholder relief tax system
for different exit times. Because exit time drives the magnitude of capital gains tax-
ation, it is particularly important to investigate the impact of capital gains taxes on
investment decisions. This importance is particularly true, because many countries
have implemented capital gains taxes – e.g., Canada imposed capital gains taxation in
1972, Ireland in 1975 and Australia in 1985 – while other countries abolished capital
gains taxation between 2000 and 2012, e.g., Cyprus, the Republic of Korea, Slovenia
and China.1 By contrast, Portugal in 2010 and Austria in 2012 implemented capital
gains taxation for long-term gains.2 Furthermore, in Germany, since 2009, capital
gains are no longer tax-exempt but are generally taxable.3
Because the impact of capital gains taxation on timing, i.e., the choice of exit time in
a capital gains tax setting with exit flexibility, remains under-researched, we include
both ordinary and capital gains taxes in the decision calculus. We focus on invest-
ments in non-depreciable assets, such as corporate shares, and we examine theoret-
ically whether there is an optimal exit time, and, if no optimal exit time exists, what
would be an appropriate time to sell. Unfortunately, we find that there is no opti-
mal holding period for a present value-maximizing investor. However, we analytically
determine the breakeven exit time that guarantees present values exceeding those
from immediate sale. Furthermore, we determine the worst exit time that should be
avoided by investors. Our analysis is based on theoretical investigations, as well as
numerical schemes, elaborated in Rupp (2012). Obviously, if investors are flexible
with regard to holding time, it is important that they anticipate the tax differences
that might arise from different holding behaviors. We show that an immediate sell-off
is often more attractive than short-term holdings. We find that longer holding periods
1 See Carroll et al. (2012), pp. 7-8.
2 See Edwards (2012), p. 1.
3 For an overview of the top marginal tax rates on capital gains of the OECD countries, see, e.g.,
Pomerleau (2014), p. 7.
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can be beneficial if the investor does not abandon the project at the worst exit time
but waits until the breakeven exit time, i.e., until the present value of an immediate
sell-off can be recovered. Obviously, capital gains taxation delays exit decisions. Be-
yond the well-known impact of retention policies, we clarify that the breakeven exit
time particularly depends on the degree of income and corporate tax integration. A
classic corporate tax system often induces holdings over more than 100 periods. By
contrast, a shareholder relief system indicates the earliest breakeven exit time and
thus the highest level of exit timing flexibility. Surprisingly, high retention rates are
likely to accelerate sales under a classic corporate system. Additionally, the worst exit
time, which should be avoided by investors, differs tremendously across tax systems.
For an integrated tax system with full imputation, it is reached earlier than under
partial or non-integrated systems.
These results help to predict investors’ behavior regarding changes in capital gains
taxation conditioned on the underlying tax system. Our results are interesting for
both investors and tax policymakers.
To answer our research questions, we determine the present value of the future cash
flows from investment as a decision criterion. After introducing the relevant literature
in section 2, we use Gordon’s growth model in section 3 (Gordon and Shapiro 1956;
Gordon 1962) as the basic asset pricing model to derive a solution theoretically for
the underlying investment decision in section 4. This model enables us to investigate
the impacts of dividends and capital gains taxation on holding decisions. First, we
describe the pre-tax model, and then we integrate taxes into the model. To show the
differences that arise from three underlying tax systems, we focus on the change in
the present value of the investment in each scenario, and we conduct a sensitivity
analysis that provides a first impression of the influence of different parameters, e.g.,
the retention rate. In section 4, we analytically determine the exit time with the lowest
present value for different tax systems. We find that this worst-case exit time varies
significantly depending on the underlying tax system, often making an immediate sale
optimal. Employing Newton’s method as a numerical scheme to find the zeros of the
relevant equation, we identify the breakeven exit period, which must be exceeded to
obtain present values that are higher than those with an immediate sale. In section 5,
we present the paper’s conclusions.
3
2 Prior Literature
Several analytical and empirical studies have investigated the impact of taxation on
investment in corporate stocks and asset prices, particularly of the effects that arise
from capital gains taxation (Feldstein et al. 1980; Bradford 1981; Stiglitz 1983; Auer-
bach 1989; Auerbach 1991; Lang and Shackelford 2000; Blouin et al. 2002; Ayers et al.
2003; Guenther and Sansing 2006; Dai et al. 2008; Becker et al. 2013; Campbell et al.
2013). The literature provides evidence that stock prices react to capital gains tax
rate changes. Furthermore, there have been empirical studies across different (capital
gains) tax systems; e.g., Poterba and Weisbenner (2001) examined U.S. (turn-of-the-
year) stock returns across three capital gains tax regimes (a total of 34 years). In their
empirical analysis, they found significant differences across these three systems. They
explained this observation by individual investors adjusting their trading behavior to
the respective tax regime. Another empirical study was conducted by Jacob (2014).
Based on a sample of Swedish individuals, he provided evidence that the tax regime,
either progressive or proportional, impacts the realization of capital gains. Both stud-
ies, Poterba and Weisbenner (2001) and Jacob (2014), accounted for restrictions in the
deductibility of capital losses.
Distortive tax effects under different tax regimes with capital gains taxation have
also been identified analytically by König and Wosnitza (2000) and Schreiber and Ro-
gall (2000). The latter analyzed the German Corporate Tax Reform of 2001, which
abolished the full imputation system and introduced shareholder relief. They found
distortions after the tax reform but a reduction in the double taxation of capital gains.
König and Wosnitza (2000) used Gordon’s growth model to compare the imputation
tax system with and without capital gains taxation. They showed that capital gains
taxation distorts price formation on the stock market due to temporary double taxa-
tion. The result is discrimination of equity investment against debt capital, rendering
the founding of businesses more difficult. Moreover, Sureth (2006) and Sureth and
Langeleh (2007) identified a distorting effect of capital gains taxes on investment un-
der full imputation, shareholder relief and classic tax systems. Sureth and Langeleh
(2007) theoretically investigated the effects of varying degrees of integration of cor-
porate and capital gains tax into income tax and the impacts on investment decisions.
Using the growth model, they could not theoretically determine a general solution for
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the investment problem, i.e., the decision to invest in shares or in the capital mar-
ket under different tax regimes. Only under restrictive assumptions could they find
that the shareholder relief tax system induces more severe distortions than the full
imputation tax system. In a sensitivity analysis, they investigated the influence of dif-
ferent retention rates, as well as different holding periods, on investment value under
an imputation system. They found that the distortive tax effects increase with the
retention rate. Moreover, they emphasized the relevance of the time of sale under a
capital gains tax. Knoll and Wenger (2007) found that the introduction of a flat tax on
dividends particularly discriminates against private domestic equity investors in high
tax brackets.
Selling an investment often leads to capital gains disclosures and, consequently,
to capital gains taxation. Because capital gains crucially depend on the duration of
an investment, we investigate investment decisions with exit flexibility. Despite the
body of empirical literature on capital gains taxes and trading behavior (Bogart and
Gentry 1995; Ivkovic´ et al. 2005; Ayers et al. 2008; Haesner and Schanz 2013) and
the body of theoretical studies accounting for loss-offset opportunities in this context
(Constantinides 1983; Stiglitz 1983; Nippel and Podlech 2011; Ehling et al. 2013), all
of these studies focused on listed corporations. However, little attention has been
paid to the impact of capital gains taxation on both investment in corporate shares in
general and the holding period under different tax systems.
There is a body of literature on the effects of taxation on investment decisions and
holding periods. For example, Protopapadakis (1983) estimated the effective marginal
tax rate of capital gains and emphasized the influence of the expected holding pe-
riod and these expected effective tax rates using U.S. IRS data estimates on average,
rather long holding periods of 24 and 31 years. Cook and O’Hare (1987) studied the
relationship between holding periods and after-tax rates of return in a capital gains
tax setting. They distinguished between finite and infinite (realized at death) dura-
tions. A tax rate increase reduces the after-tax rate of return of short-run realizations
for finite durations, while the after-tax rate of return of long-run realizations either
decreases or increases, depending on the relationship of the investment rate with in-
ternal growth. In their empirical investigation, they found evidence that the marginal
capital gains tax rate from the year before death does not have a significant impact
on capital gains realized at death. In agreement with these findings, Gau and Wang
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(1994), who empirically investigated the determinants of holding period decisions re-
garding real investment, found that the current market interest rate, consumption,
and investment preferences are more important than tax issues. By contrast, Klein
(1999) found capital gains taxes to be an important driver of holding decisions. He
elaborated a general equilibrium asset pricing model with capital gains taxation that
occurs upon realization. He illustrated that the optimal holding of a given stock de-
pends on the individual deferral terms, accrued capital gains and expected holding
periods of all investors. König and Wosnitza (2004) determined the optimal economic
lifetime of an investment in the presence of taxes given that, in the absence of taxes,
the investor is indifferent between selling and holding the investment. They showed
that the investor should never sell an investment if selling discloses hidden reserves,
i.e., capital gains (and vice versa).4 Although they also identifed distortional effects
of taxation on holding decisions, in contrast with our study, they assumed exoge-
nously given liquidation proceeds and a depreciable investment object that can be
replaced at an optimal point in time. Furthermore, they did not explicitly distinguish
among different taxes. Niemann and Sureth (2013) examined the impact of capital
gains taxation on investment timing under simultaneous investment and abandon-
ment flexibility. They showed numerically that capital gains taxation accelerates risky
investment under specific conditions, e.g., high liquidation proceeds, more conserva-
tive tax accounting, low interest rates, and low volatility (Cremer et al. 2010). Jacob
(2013) empirically studied the impact of capital gains taxes on holding behavior af-
ter the 2001 German Corporate Tax Reform. He provided evidence that capital gains
realizations are deferred if marginal income tax rates are high.
To summarize, the existing literature has offered mixed results regarding the im-
pact of taxes on holding and exit decisions. Niemann and Sureth (2013) already illus-
trated that, under certain conditions, capital gains taxation can accelerate investments
in simultaneous entry and exit decisions. In contrast with our study, they neither dis-
tinguished among different tax systems nor focused on the impact of profit retention
rates, which we identify as important drivers for holding decisions.
4 See König and Wosnitza (2004), pp. 106-126.
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3 Model
In Gordon’s growth model, the present value of investment V0 is determined by future
dividends D, which are generated by the investment project. An investor realizes all
investment projects that, in present value terms, earn more than the initial investment
outlay. Gordon’s growth model is a discrete time model; thus, we examine time t ∈ N0.
3.1 Tax-free Model
In agreement with these previous studies we assume a private investor A that spends
I0 on an investment in shares of a corporation. To determine the present value of
the investment V0, the investor discounts all future dividends D with the exogenously
given periodical interest rate i ∈ (0, 1). For example, this interest rate could be easily
interpreted as a monthly, quarterly or annual interest rate. The observed time horizon
is determined by t ∈ N0. Profits P arise after one period, starting at t = 1. The rate of
return of the alternative investment in the capital market is denoted by i.5 We assume
that the capital market is perfect and certain. Therefore, the present value V0 can be
described as a function of γ and i,6
V0[γ, i] =
∞∑
t=1
D[t, γ]
(1+ i)t , (1)
where γ denotes the retention rate. Here, dividends D[t, γ] are the distributed part
of the investment profits P[t]. At the firm level, a constant fraction γ ∈ [0, 1] of the
profits is retained7
R[t, γ] = γ · P[t], (2)
where R[t, γ] describes the retained profits in t , while distributing the remainder as
dividends:
D[t, γ] = (1− γ) · P[t]. (3)
5 See Gordon and Shapiro (1956), p. 104.
6 See Gordon and Shapiro (1956), p. 104.
7 See Gordon and Shapiro (1956), p. 105. Note, that in the following, we consider γ to be exogenously
given. Consistent with prior literature, we do not account for information asymmetry or other
signaling causes. We further abstract from the retention rate being less sensitive to cash flows if
dividend taxes are sufficiently high as suggested by empirical evidence. See, e.g., Jacob and Jacob
(2013).
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The profits from the previous period P[t − 1] and the return on retained profits serve
as the basis for the profits at t . The profits of the current period are P[1] = iI0. Hence,
we obtain
P[t] = (1+ γi) · P[t − 1]. (4)
where, γi is the constant growth rate that characterizes Gordon’s growth model,
which, in the literature, is typically denoted as g.
By assumption, the internal and external rates of return are both equal to i. Un-
der this assumption, the underlying investment can only be more attractive than the
alternative capital market investment in the case of a (non-neutral) tax system. Con-
sequently, in the absence of taxes, the investor will always be indifferent between the
investment in the corporation and the alternative investment.
The investor A holds the investment object for a specific period. At time t = z,
she or he sells her or his investment to another private investor B at a price S[z, γ, i]
with z ≥ 0. On the one hand, if the price is greater than the investment outlay I0, the
investor earns a capital gain, G[z, γ, i].
G[z, γ, i] = S[z, γ, i]− I0. (5)
On the other hand, the investor realizes a capital loss if the price is less than I0.8
Investor B holds the investment until T = ∞. The present value V0[z, γ, i] captures all
future cash flows; i.e., it contains the discounted cash flow and the discounted price.9
We obtain
V0[z, γ, i] =
z∑
t=1
D[t, γ]
(1+ i)t +
S[z, γ, i]
(1+ i)z . (6)
Finally, we determine the price S[z, γ, i], which, for investor B, is determined by the
dividends earned after the sale at t = z. At the same time, the price is the minimum
price that the investor A is willing to accept to sell the investment. In Gordon’s growth
model, this price for A and B is given by10
S[z, γ, i] =
∞∑
t=z+1
D[t, γ]
(1+ i)t−z = I0(1+ γi)
z. (7)
8 See eq. (5).
9 See König and Wosnitza (2000), p. 785; Sureth and Langeleh (2007), p. 315.
10 Determined by applying the geometric series.
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The present value V0[z, γ, i] is a function of i and thus includes a comparison of the
two investment alternatives, namely the real investment in shares and the alternative
investment in the capital market. If V0[z, γ, i] is greater than I0, the real investment
is more attractive than the capital market investment. If V0[z, γ, i] is smaller than I0,
the investor prefers the alternative capital market investment. If V0[z, γ, i] equals I0,
the investor is indifferent between the two alternatives.11
3.2 General Tax Model
In the following, we integrate taxes into the growth model. We model a general tax
system, which can be easily transformed into a classic corporate tax system, a full
imputation tax system and a shareholder relief tax system.12
The profits P[t, τc] are taxed at the corporate tax rate τc ∈ [0, 1),
P[t, τc] = P[t] · (1− τc). (8)
After corporate taxation, profits can be distributed. The retained fraction is R[t, γ, τc] =
γP[t] · (1−τc). The dividend fraction is given by D[t, γ, τc] = (1−γ)P[t] · (1−ατc).
Dividends are subject to shareholder level taxation. Income taxes at rate τ must be
paid on dividends. Depending on the tax system, a fraction of corporate tax is im-
putable to the income tax. We denote the fraction of corporate tax that cannot be
imputed for income tax purposes α ∈ [0, 1], and we obtain
P[t, τc] = γP[t] · (1− τc)+ (1− γ)P[t] · (1−ατc). (9)
We restrict γ to
γ < 1 and γ <
iτ
iτc
(10)
for all tax systems. With this restriction, we avoid results that are absurd from an
economic point of view.13
11 See, e.g., König and Wosnitza (2004), p. 139.
12 See König and Wosnitza (2000) for a model under an imputation system; for a more general ap-
proach, see Sureth and Langeleh (2007), pp. 315-317.
13 If we allowed for γ ≥ iτiτc we would model infinite growth. Infinite growth is unrealistic and excluded
from our model for plausibility reasons. See Sureth (2006), pp. 58, 74; Sureth and Langeleh (2007),
p. 317.
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At the shareholder level, interest and dividends are subject to income tax at a rate
τ ∈ [0, 1). Investors A and B have the same income tax rate. The income tax rate is
equal to the personal tax rate of the investor. We assume that capital gains are taxed at
a special tax rate τg = τ2 . The parameter β ∈ [0, 1] denotes the fractions of dividends
and capital gains that are subject to income taxation. For simplicity, we abstract from
different capital gains the tax rates for short- and long-term capital gains. Moreover,
we assume a full and complete capital gains loss offset. Thus, we indicate that capital
losses that arise from the underlying project might be immediately offset against
positive capital gains generated by other projects. Consequently, whenever a capital
loss is incurred, the investor receives a capital tax refund. Furthermore, we refrain
from conducting a sensitivity analysis with regard to the capital gains tax rate and its
impact on the holding period, because we will show that the critical thresholds for
holding decisions are unaffected by the level of capital gains taxation.
In our model, we do not consider any tax privilege regarding interest income. There-
fore, the after-tax market rate of return is given by
iτ = i · (1− τ). (11)
Post-income tax dividends are calculated as
D[t, γ, τ, τc] = (1− γ)P[t] · (1−ατc) · (1− βτ). (12)
The after-tax price amounts to
S[z, γ, i, τ, τc , τg] =
∞∑
t=z+1
D[t, γ, τ, τc]
(1+ iτ)t−z −
( ∞∑
t=z+1
D[t, γ, τ, τc]
(1+ iτ)t−z − I0
)
· βτg. (13)
First, the after-tax dividends of investor B are discounted to time z. The difference
between the discounted dividends and the initial outlay I0 is subject to capital gains
taxation at a rate τg ∈ [0, 1).14
14 See Müller and Semmler (2003), who use a more complex approach and show theoretically that
deferred capital gains taxes on hidden reserves reduce the price that arises from negotiations
between seller and buyer.
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The present value after taxation for real investment is given by
VGT0 [z, γ, i, τ, τc , τg] =
z∑
t=1
(1− γ)P[t] · (1−ατc) · (1− βτ)
(1+ iτ)t +
S[z, γ, i, τ, τc , τg]
(1+ iτ)z .
(14)
Here, we use GT as a suffix for the present value under the general tax system. Then,
based on equation (14), we model three specific tax systems.15 The classic corporate
tax system, indicated by the suffix CC, is given by α = 1 and β = 1 and, thus,16
VCC0 [z, γ, i, τ, τc , τg] =
z∑
t=1
(1− γ)P[t] · (1− τc) · (1− τ)
(1+ iτ)t +
S[z, γ, i, τ, τc , τg]
(1+ iτ)z . (15)
Here, the corporate tax burden is non-refundable.
The shareholder relief tax system, indicated by SR, is characterized by α = 1 and
β = 0.5, which indicate that 50% of dividends and capital gains are assumed to be
subject to income taxation17
VSR0 [z, γ, i, τ, τc , τg] =
z∑
t=1
(1− γ)P[t] · (1− τc) · (1− 0.5τ)
(1+ iτ)t +
S[z, γ, i, τ, τc , τg]
(1+ iτ)z .
(16)
The full imputation tax system, indicated by FI, is characterized by α = 0 and β = 1
and is thus given by18
VFI0 [z, γ, i, τ, τc , τg] =
z∑
t=1
(1− γ)P[t] · (1− τ)
(1+ iτ)t +
S[z, γ, i, τ, τc , τg]
(1+ iτ)z . (17)
15 See König and Wosnitza (2000), p. 786; Sureth and Langeleh (2007), p. 322.
16 Under a classic corporate tax system, income and corporate taxes are levied independently on
shareholder and company levels. The withholding tax system, which was introduced in Germany
in 2009, can be regarded as a classic corporate tax system.
17 E.g., the shareholder relief tax system was introduced in Germany in 2001 and later reformed and
accompanied by a flat tax on most types of capital income. Today, the shareholder relief is only
rarely applicable. If dividends and capital gains qualify for shareholder relief, then a fraction of
40% is tax-exempted. The shareholder relief tax system actually still is in force in several countries,
e.g., Luxembourg, Norway and France. See BMF (2013), pp. 12-13.
18 In Germany, the full imputation tax system was implemented from 1977 to 2000. A full imputation
tax system is actually present in Malta. See BMF (2013), p. 14.
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4 Holding Decisions
4.1 Parameter sensitivity
To investigate the holding decision, we use the general form of the present value
function,19 and in the following, we simplify D[t, γ, τ, τc] to Dt .
Vτ0 =
z∑
t=1
Dt · (1−ατc) · (1− βτ)
(1+ iτ)t +
∞∑
t=z+1
Dt · (1−ατc) · (1− βτ)
(1+ iτ)t (18)
−
( ∞∑
t=z+1
Dt · (1−ατc) · (1− βτ)
(1+ iτ)t−z − I0
)
· βτg · (1+ iτ)−z
= I0 · (1− βτ)(1− γ)(1−ατ
c)
(1− τ)− γ(1− τc)
(
1− βτg ·
(1+ γiτc )z − (1−τ)−γ(1−τc)(1−βτ)(1−γ)(1−ατc)
(1+ iτ)z
)
= I0 ·φ ·
(
1− βτg ·
(1+ γiτc )z − 1φ
(1+ iτ)z
)
with φ = (1−βτ)(1−γ)(1−ατc)(1−τ)−γ(1−τc) .
The coefficient φ captures all of the effects that arise from current taxation. By con-
trast, effects from capital gains taxation are included in the third factor in brackets.
The distortion from current taxation (φ) is driven by the corporate and income tax
rates τc and τ , the parameters α and β, which indicate the degree of corporate and
income tax integration, respectively, and the retention rate γ, which indirectly deter-
mines the part of the periodical profit that is paid out as dividends. The capital gains
tax rate does not enter φ. This separation of effects from current and capital gains
taxation enables us to use the coefficient φ to study the respective effects in detail.
Even if z = 0, however, we find capital gains taxes can distort the investment de-
cision. Given that φ ≠ 1 and z = 0 we obtain Vτ0 ≠ I0. Thus, non-aligned taxation
of current profits at the corporate and investor’s levels can generate a non-zero cap-
ital gains tax base even for immediate sales. The overall impact of the coefficient φ
on the after-tax present value Vτ0 is ambiguous and might, depending on the degree
19 See eqs. (13) and (14), and Sureth and Langeleh (2007), p. 317.
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of integration of corporate taxation into income taxation, either foster or hinder real
investments, compared to the default alternative.
To address our research question about the influence of taxes on the exit time, we
conduct sensitivity analyses. These numerical investigations provide a first impres-
sion of the extent to which the exit time drives the after-tax present value. First, we
illustrate the present value for the three tax systems under predefined conditions. In
the second step, we vary the retention rates. The retention rate determines the capital
gains tax base, which is also determined by the exit time.
For illustrative purposes, we assume a retention rate of γ = 0.5, which can be ob-
served often.20 Additionally, the assumed tax rates, τ = 0.4, τc = 0.4 and τg = τ2 ,
are based on real-world tax rates and are, e.g., similar to the top marginal income and
corporate tax rates in Germany in 2000.21 Furthermore, we assume a pre-tax interest
rate of i = 0.1.22
Figure 1 provides an overview of the present values under three tax systems depend-
ing on time t = z. This figure depicts the present value with capital gains taxation (Vτ0 )
and without capital gains taxation (I0 ·φ). In the following, for the after-tax present
value V0[z, γ, i, τ, τc , τg] we write for simplicity Vτ0 , and the after-tax price at time z,
previously denoted by S[z, γ, i, τ, τc , τg], is simplified to Sτz .
While the present value without capital gains taxation I0φ does not depend on time
t = z, under all three tax systems, considering capital gains, taxation Vτ0 generates a
non-linear function of z. Hence, there is an obvious time effect caused by capital gains
taxation. Capital gains taxation affects the exit time and, hence, the after-tax present
value of a project. We observe two reciprocal effects. On the one hand, there is a
strong growth effect: the later the exit occurs, the greater the capital gains are (taxable
base) because retained earnings increase over time. On the other hand, for late exits,
the capital gains tax is relatively low because the tax is paid upon realization. Thus,
the discount effect reduces the tax payment in present value terms, especially for
late exits. If one effect perfectly outweighs the other, there will be no minimum, and
20 See Halberstadt et al. (2009), p. 376.
21 For an overview of various tax rates in OECD countries, see OECD (2014) and, e.g., Schanz and
Schanz (2011), pp.146-154.
22 An interest rate of i = 0.1 is often used in analytical research. However, because currently interest
rates are significantly lower, we conducted sensitivity analyses for lower rates, as well.
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Vτ0 under FI I0φ under FI
Vτ0 under SR I0φ under SR
....... Vτ0 under CC .......... I0φ under CC
Figure 1: After-tax present value Vτ0 depending on the time of sale z with I0 = 1, τc = 0.4,
τ = 0.4 and γ = 0.5
the present value will monotonically increase or decrease in z. If the two effects do
not perfectly balance, a minimum can be found because the invested funds grow at
a specific rate γi over time (see eq.(4)) while the capital gains tax base (see eq.(13)),
i.e., the difference in the present value of accumulated future dividends at time z
and the investment outlay,
∞∑
t=z+1
D[t,γ,τ,τc]
(1+iτ)t−z − I0 (capital gains), has to be discounted at
another rate, i.e., the after-tax capital market rate.23 Therefore, the present value after
taxes decreases to a minimum value (growth effect). For later exit times z, the capital
gains tax is paid later, and the tax payments have less impact on the present value
(discount effect). After a minimum value is reached, the discount effect exceeds the
growth effect, and the curve increases until the capital gains tax converges to zero.
If there is no capital gains tax, then Vτ0 reduces to I0φ = Vτ0 . Figure 1 shows that
the present value converges asymptotically to the present value without capital gains
23 The opposing effects from these two growths processes can be clarified by taking a look at the
underlying type of functions. This type of function has the form (I0 ewt − I0) e−iτ t where w is the
above-mentioned after-tax specific growth rate that may differ from iτ . For illustrative purposes,
we use the continuous-time form. For this kind of function, global extrema can be found.
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taxation over the long run. This pattern holds for all three tax systems.24 We conduct
sensitivity analyses with respect to the underlying interest rate i and find that constel-
lations with Vτ0 < 1 for low interest rates occur more often than for the relatively high
rate of i = 0.1. That is, an investor will more often refrain from undertaking invest-
ment in capital stocks under low capital market rates of return. We find that lower
interest rates slightly reduce the magnitude but do not change the general direction
or characteristics of the identified effects.25
Under both the shareholder relief tax system and the classic corporate tax system,
the present value with capital gains taxation is greater than the present value without
capital gains taxation for early exits. This relation is due to a capital loss tax refund. A
capital loss results if the price after corporate and income taxes falls below the initial
outlay, i.e.,
∞∑
t=z+1
D[t,γ,τ,τc]
(1+iτ)t−z − I0 < 0. Corresponding to the previously described scenar-
ios with capital gains, a capital loss may occur even for an immediate sale, i.e., if z = 0.
This is true if corporate and income taxes are fully integrated, hence, for tax systems
other than a full imputation system. However, such an investment is characterized by
Vτ0 < 1 and would not be completed because the alternative investment in the capital
market is more attractive to the investor.26 In our subsequent analyses, we will ex-
clude investments with present values below one, i.e., negative net present values.27
Nevertheless, for now, we use this setting to elaborate the forces at work. If z = 0,
we invest and divest in the same period. When we invest I0 in all of these tax sys-
tems, our return differs. This distortion is due to the interplay of dividends, interest
effects, corporate tax rates, and retention rates. We find a tradeoff under full impu-
tation, whereas discrimination against investments in corporate shares compared to
alternative investments arises under the other two systems. Even for z = 0, there is
a tax refund for capital losses under the shareholder relief and classic corporate tax
systems caused by these distortive effects from current taxation (see figure 1).
24 See Sureth and Langeleh (2007), p. 320, for the full imputation tax system. Extending their study,
we show the development for all three different tax systems over time.
25 The worst exit time zmin is increasing in i under all three tax systems. Additionally, we find the
breakeven exit time zg increasing in the interest rate in the numerical analysis of the interest
sensitivity of Vτ0 > 1. See sections 4.3 and 4.4 for further explanations about the worst exit time
and breakeven exit time.
26 Investors will refrain from investment particularly in a setting with certainty concerning all future
cash flows.
27 The investor would only carry out the investment if she or he is at least indifferent between the
investment and the alternative financial investment.
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Figure 2 illustrates the present values Vτ0 for different retention rates γ under a full
imputation tax system.28
Vτ0 for γ = 0.7 I0φ
. Vτ0 for γ = 0.5; . I0φ
...... Vτ0 for γ = 0.3 .......... I0φ
Vτ0 for γ = 0.1 I0φ
Figure 2: After-tax present value Vτ0 depending on the retention ratio γ under the full imputa-
tion system with I0 = 1, τc = 0.4 and τ = 0.5
The higher the retention rate γ, the more pronounced the curvature of the present
value function and the greater the difference between φ and Vτ0 . This relation is
essential for the pronounced impact of capital gains taxation for high retention ratios.
Especially for early exit times z, the curvature of the graph is strong.29 The effect of
capital gains taxation for high retention ratios is visible for late exit times, as well.
However, for low retention ratios it only affects early exit times. In figure 2, for a
retention rate of γ = 0.7, the influence of capital gains taxation is visible until z = 500,
while for a retention rate of γ = 0.1, this effect occurs only until approximately z =
80. For long-term investment the decision relevance of capital gain taxes vanishes.
Hence, this finding indicates that the investor should consider capital gains taxation
particularly for short holding periods in decision making.
28 See Rupp (2012), p. 37.
29 If the capital gains taxation is paid early, the influence on the present value after taxes Vτ0 is strong.
The discount effect is very weak for early exit times z.
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In addition to the characteristics of the tax systems (FI, SR, CC) and the retention
rate γ, tax rates influence the present value after taxes for various exit times z. There-
fore, we vary the tax rates in our sensitivity analysis, because the tax rates are exposed
to multiple changes by tax reforms and severely affect our results.30
Figure 3: After-tax present value Vτ0 de-
pending on the income tax rate
τ under the full imputation sys-
tem with I0 = 1, τc = 0.4 and
γ = 0.5
Vτ0 for τ = 0.5 I0φ
. . Vτ0 for τ = 0.4 . . I0φ
....... Vτ0 for τ = 0.3 ........... I0φ
Vτ0 for τ = 0.1 I0φ
Figure 4: After-tax present value Vτ0 de-
pending on the corporate tax
rate τc under the full imputa-
tion system with I0 = 1, τ = 0.4
and γ = 0.5
Vτ0 for τc = 0.1 I0φ
. . Vτ0 for τc = 0.3 . . I0φ
....... Vτ0 for τc = 0.4 ............ I0φ
Vτ0 for τc = 0.5 I0φ
Figure 3 (left hand side) illustrates the after-tax present value as a function of z
for various income tax rates τ , and figure 4 (right hand side) displays the after-tax
present value as a function of z for various corporate tax rates τc . We plot the results
for the full imputation tax system as an example of our analysis.31
The same curve characteristics that are already known from figures 1 and 2 can be
observed.32 The tax rates have an opposite influence on the after-tax present values.
While an increasing income tax rate τ in figure 3 increases the value of Vτ0 , an increas-
ing corporate tax rate reduces Vτ0 . If the income tax rate τ increases, the alternative
investment in the capital market is most affected. Interest payments are fully taxed, as
30 For example the business tax reform 2008 in Germany and the tax reform 2000 in Germany.
31 See Sureth (2006), pp. 82-84, Sureth and Langeleh (2007), p. 320, and Rupp (2012), p. 36.
32 The curvature is driven by the growth and the discount effect.
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are the current earnings from the investment in shares, i.e., dividends33. By contrast,
capital gains, by assumption, are only subject to halved income tax rate, i.e., τg = τ2 .
The slope of the curve is more pronounced at higher income tax rates because capital
gains taxation increases proportionally with the income tax rate. This result is in line
with Jacob (2013), who finds empirical evidence for deferred capital gains realizations
under German shareholder relief if marginal income tax rates are high.34
An increase in corporate tax rate τc in figure 4 leads to a decrease of Vτ0 because
retained earnings are reduced and weaken internal growth.35 As a result, the after-tax
present value decreases. The slope of the curve is more pronounced for lower corpo-
rate tax rates because capital gains are higher and therefore have greater influence on
the present value.
In summary, an investor must especially consider high income tax rates τ and low
corporate tax rates τc when deciding on exit time z because the present value of the
investment is particularly sensitive to these parameters.
4.2 Analytical Approach
Until now, our conclusion, exactly as in prior research, has been restricted to the
underlying numerical examples. To improve the explanatory power of our results, in
the next step, we aim to determine the optimal exit time in a theoretical fashion.
In the following, we study Vτ0 under three tax regimes with capital gains taxation.
We use the first derivative to calculate the extreme values of the present value equa-
tion with regard to z. If we find a maximum, we have identified the optimal exit time,
that is, the value at which Vτ0 is highest.
For our analytical calculation, we set all of the variables, except for z, and we as-
sume that the function for the present value of the investment can be continuously
differentiated. We set
Vτ0 [z] := Vτ0 [z, γ, τ, τc , τg, i]. (19)
33 Dividends are also fully subject to the income tax rate.
34 Note that he uses data from 2001 and 2004 where short-term capital gains were tax-exempted.
35 For empirical evidence on the impact of the corporate tax rate on investment, see, e.g., Brandstetter
and Jacob (2014) and Diller and Theelen (2014).
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To determine the optimal exit time we use eq. (19) and the first and the second
derivatives of Vτ0 with regard to z36
d
dz
Vτ0 [z] = −I0 ·φ · βτg ·
(
ln(1+ γiτc)− ln(1+ iτ)) · (1+ γiτc)z + ln(1+ iτ) · 1φ
(1+ iτ)z .
(20)
d2
dz2
Vτ0 [z] = −I0 ·φ · βτg ·
(
ln(1+ γiτc)− ln(1+ iτ))2 · (1+ γiτc)z − (ln(1+ iτ))2 · 1φ
(1+ iτ)z .
(21)
The necessary condition for the optimum is given by:
d
dz
Vτ0 [z] = −I0 ·φ · βτg ·
(
ln(1+ γiτc)− ln(1+ iτ)) · (1+ γiτc)z + ln(1+ iτ) · 1φ
(1+ iτ)z
!= 0.
(22)
Because I0 > 0, β > 0, τg > 0, and (1 + iτ)z > 0 by definition37, we must examine
whether φ, with
φ = (1− βτ)(1− γ)(1−ατ
c)
(1− τ)− γ(1− τc) (23)
is positive or negative. The numerator in equation (23) is always greater than zero.
This value is true as (1−βτ) > 0 because β ∈ [0, 1], and τ ∈ [0, 1); (1−γ) > 0 because
γ ∈ [0, 1); and (1 − ατc) > 0 because α ∈ [0, 1] and τc ∈ [0, 1). The denominator of
the fraction is greater than zero if
(1− τ)− γ(1− τc) > 0⇐⇒ γ < 1− τ
1− τc . (24)
While in equation (10) , we have assumed that γ < iτiτc , the denominator is positive
and thus φ > 0. We simplify equation (22) to38
0 = (ln(1+ γiτc)− ln(1+ iτ)) · (1+ γiτc)z + ln(1+ iτ) · 1
φ (25)
36 See Rupp (2012), pp. 29-30.
37 We have defined β with β ∈ [0, 1]. For the underlying tax systems, β is set either equal to 0.5 or 1
and always greater than zero.
38 See Rupp (2012), pp. 31-32.
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and solve the equation with regard to z
z =
ln
(
− ln(1+iτ)
ln
(
1+γiτc
1+iτ
) · 1φ
)
ln(1+ γiτc )
.
(26)
Equation (26) describes the exit time z that fulfills the necessary condition in equation
(22). To determine whether it is a maximum or a minimum, we must examine the
second derivative:
d2
dz2
Vτ0 [z] = −I0 ·φ · βτg ·
(
ln(1+ γiτc)− ln(1+ iτ))2 · (1+ γiτc)z − (ln(1+ iτ))2 · 1φ
(1+ iτ)z .
Given that I0 > 0, φ > 0, βτg > 0 and (1 + iτ)z > 0, in the final step, we investigate
whether the numerator in equation (21) is negative and, thus, whether
(
ln(1+ γiτc)− ln(1+ iτ))2 · (1+ γiτc)z − (ln(1+ iτ))2 · 1
φ
< 0. (27)
Because all of the parts of inequality (27) are negative, we can simplify it to:
1 <
(ln(1+ iτ))2 · 1φ
(1+ γiτc)z · (ln(1+ γiτc)− ln(1+ iτ))2 . (28)
After transposing the inequality, it is obvious that the right hand side of inequality
(28) is greater than zero. Overall, the second derivative is positive. Hence, because the
function is strictly convex, the extreme value is a global minimum. A global maximum
does not exist.
Although we cannot determine the optimal exit time, our results (see eq. (28))
indicate that there is a worst time to exit, i.e., the time that generates the minimum
present value.39
4.3 Worst Exit Time
The worst exit time, in the following denoted by zmin, is interesting for the investor
because she or he should avoid selling the investment at this time or close to this
time. In other words, she or he must minimize the possibility of a liquidity squeeze
especially during this time of sale because then the lowest present value would be
39 See also figure 2.
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realized. Figure 5 displays the exit times with the lowest present values for different
retention ratios for the three underlying tax systems.40
For small retention ratios, the worst exit time zmin significantly depends on the re-
spective tax system, as shown in Figure 5. For high retention ratios, the worst exit
times are very similar for all three tax systems. High retention rates indicate a large
amount of retained earnings and thus high capital gains and a relatively large weight
in overall taxes of capital gains taxes, while a low retention rate indicates low capital
gains taxes but instead relatively high weight of taxes on dividend payouts. Figure
5 illustrates that dividend taxation, which is pronounced under low retention rates,
induces greater deviations across the underlying tax systems than capital gains tax-
ation. This result holds for all tax rate relations, i.e., τc = τ , τc < τ and τc > τ .
For a low retention rate of γ = 0.1, the worst exit time is reached after 18 periods
under the full imputation tax system, while it requires 104 (55) periods in the clas-
sic corporate (shareholder relief) tax system. For a high retention rate (γ = 0.9), the
worst exit times are reached after 44 periods (FI), 54 periods (CC), and 49 periods (SR).
worst exit time under FI
worst exit time under SR
...... worst exit time under CC
Figure 5: Worst exit time zmin depending on the retention rate γ with τc = 0.4 and τ = 0.4
We conclude that the type of tax system is particularly important for the holding
decision if the dividend rate is sizable. Against this background, especially in coun-
40 τc = 0.4;τ = 0.4.
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tries with tax systems that are volatile, the investor should be aware that the worst
exit time zmin can change tremendously after substantial tax reform. Prior studies
have clarified that the tax systems in many countries often change.41 If a corporation
that is situated in a country with a volatile tax system distributes most of its profits
(sizable dividend rate), changes in the tax system can change their exit timing because
the reform is likely to change the worst and avoidable exit times. Furthermore, divi-
dend rates between 27% and 61%, on average (i.e., relatively high retention rates), can
be observed in several countries.42 Some empirical studies have provided evidence
that dividend ratios tend to increase every year.43 By contrast, other studies have
indicated, on average, a decrease in the dividend payout. Nevertheless, their findings
have indicated that “... larger firms, firms with higher profitability, and firms with
lower growth opportunities have a greater propensity to pay dividends.”44 Using Ger-
man stock exchange indices45 as an example shows that some DAX- and MDAX-listed
firms have especially high dividend ratios (approximately 70% of DAX-listed firms
have a dividend rate greater than 35%, and 30% have a ratio greater than 65%). In
other countries, e.g., Australia, a dividend rate of more than 2/3 of their stock perfor-
mance, on average, can be observed.46 In countries with such high payout rates, it is
even more important to account for the holding implications of possible tax reforms.
4.4 Extremes at the Boundaries
Until now, we have determined the extreme values of the present value function. It
was found that there is only a global minimum, that is, the worst time to sell shares.
This point in time depends on the underlying tax system and is especially sensitive
to high dividend rates. To determine the point of time that is the best exit time, we
examine the boundaries of equation (19). The present value functions under all three
41 E.g., Becker et al. (2013) investigate the effect of payout taxes on the allocation of investment and
report on the tax regimes across 25 countries between 1990 and 2008. Among these countries, 13
changed their tax system within the observed period. Spain and Mexico even have two variations
of their tax systems. See Becker et al. (2013), p. 6.
42 See ap Gwilym et al. (2006), p. 39, who provide a descriptive overview over the payout ratios
between 1965/1973/1990-2004 of eleven countries that are considered representative for the in-
dustrialized world.
43 See ap Gwilym et al. (2006), pp. 38-39.
44 Fatemi and Bildik (2012), p. 677.
45 See Frère et al. (2012), p. 4.
46 See Frère et al. (2012), p. 14.
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tax systems are convex; thus, the highest present values emerge at the boundaries.
Given that, at the left hand side boundary, z = 0, we observe a local maximum, we
investigate the development for z > zmin.47 We want to determine whether a present
value that exceeds the local maximum at z = 0 can be achieved for sales at time
z > zmin.
For example, in figure 1, we illustrate that the local maximum of the present value
occurs at z = 0 for all tax systems. Note that, in this figure, we only depict a finite
time horizon of T = 100. Here, the present value decreases with later exit times until
a minimum present value (the worst exit time) is attained. For later exits, the present
value increases again, but it does not exceed the initial present value at z = 0 until
z = T = 100. Additionally, figure 1 illustrates that the present value with capital gains
taxation seems to converge asymptotically toward the present value without capital
gains.
To study these effects in greater detail, we determine the general conditions under
which a local extreme that exceeds the present value at z = 0 can be reached.48 Here,
we examine which of the local extremes (of the boundaries) is the global maximum.
For this purpose, we analytically compare the present value at z = 0 with the present
value at z = T . At z = 0, the present value equation is:
Vτ0 [z = 0] = I0φ
(
1− βτg ·
(
1− 1
φ
))
. (29)
For z = T , the present value equation becomes
Vτ0 [z = T] = I0φ ·
(
1− βτg ·
(1+ γiτc )T − 1φ
(1+ iτ)T
)
. (30)
Depending on T , we obtain:
Vτ0 [z = 0] S Vτ0 [z = T]. (31)
If the investor sells extremely late, i.e., (z →∞), the present value converges to
lim
z→∞V
τ
0 = I0φ, (32)
47 zmin denotes the exit time z where the global minimum is reached.
48 See Sureth and Langeleh (2007), pp. 320-321, and Rupp (2012), pp. 34-41.
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i.e., the present value without capital gains taxation.49 For the last term, which ap-
pears in brackets in equation (30), we obtain the capital gains tax multiplier:
lim
z→∞
(1+ γiτc )z − 1φ
(1+ iτ)z = 0. (33)
The multiplier converges to zero. This finding indicates that the maximum present
value at the right boundary is independent of capital gains taxation. This result is
robust for all of the investigated tax systems with capital gains taxation, i.e., for dif-
ferent tax rates and retention rates. The maximum reachable present value of the
right boundary is I0φ, which is equal to the present value without capital gains tax-
ation.50 We denote the earliest exit time, which reaches a present value of I0φ with
zmax. Then, equation (30) simplifies to
Vτ0 [T = zmax] = I0φ. (34)
Figure 6 depicts the exit time zmax.
Vτ0 I0φ
Figure 6: zmax depending on the time of sale z if φ > 1
In the following, we compare Vτ0 [z = 0] with Vτ0 [z = zmax] = I0φ[z = zmax] to
determine which of the local extremes is the global maximum and, thus, the exit time
49 See figure 6.
50 Because it is a matter of a limit value of Vτ0 , there is an error of 1e− 8. See eq. (33).
24
with the highest present value. Hence, we concentrate on the difference between the
local extrema. If the right extreme value is the global maximum, we have:
Vτ0 [z = 0] = I0 ·φ
(
1− βτg ·
(
1− 1
φ
))
< I0 ·φ[z = zmax]. (35)
Inequality (36) describes the difference of the local extrema, which reflects the capital
gains taxation and respective capital loss tax refund for an exit at z = 0.
0 < βτg
(
1− 1
φ
)
. (36)
If βτg > 0, the following condition holds:
φ > 1. (37)
If φ > 1, which indicates that the income tax rate is greater than the corporate tax
rate, inequality (35) is satisfied. Under capital gains taxation, we obtain the highest
present value for Vτ0 if the investor sells late, i.e., at z = zmax.51
We find that, if φ > 1, the global maximum value is reached at z = zmax. Thus, the
following relationship holds:
Vτ0 [z = zmax] = Vτ0 [z]|τg=0 (38)
It is interesting to determine whether there is an exit time z = zmax that leads to
identical present values for investments with capital gains taxation (Vτ0 ) and without
capital gains taxation (I0 ·φ). At this exit time, capital gains taxation is irrelevant. For
any other holding period, the investor must consider capital gains taxation in his or
her investment decision. To determine zmax, we set the two present value functions
equal and obtain:
I0 ·φ = I0 ·φ ·
(
1− βτg ·
(1+ γiτc )zmax − 1φ
(1+ iτ)zmax
)
(39)
⇐⇒ 0 =
(1+ γiτc )zmax − 1φ
(1+ iτ)zmax .
51 If φ < 1, then the inequality 0 > βτg(1− 1φ ) is satisfied. The capital loss tax refund for Vτ0 [z = 0]
leads to the highest present value if the investor sells immediately at z = 0.
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However, we cannot theoretically determine zmax from this equation. In fact, the
denominator of equation (39) is greater than zero.52 Thus, multiplying by the non-
vanishing denominator and writing φ on one side, equation (39) holds if and only if:
φ = 1
(1+ γiτc )zmax . (40)
Because the second summand on the right hand side is always non-negative, only
φ ≤ 1 is possible. Consequently, this investment project will not be completed by
the investor because its net present value is negative. For this scenario, the highest
present value of the investment can be achieved for a sell-off at z = 0. At z = 0, the
investor realizes a capital loss and receives a tax refund. However, the investment
with φ < 1 would be rejected by the investor because she or he prefers the alternative
investment in the capital market. Only investments with φ > 1 are favorable. Such
investments with positive net present values and, thus, present values Vτ0 > 1 do not
fulfill equation (39). We cannot solve this equation theoretically for φ > 1 because we
face a limit on the value53 of Vτ0 , which never reaches the value I0φ. If we accept a
certain deviation of the two present values from each other when determining zmax for
φ > 1 analytically, the investment must be held for 300 to 7,000 periods to approach
an error term of 1e − 8 to zmax. Obviously, if one holding period equals one year, a
holding period of this length is unrealistic or at least not relevant to the decision.54
Against this background, we conclude that it is not worthwhile to conduct a numerical
investigation to obtain a more precise value for zmax. Nevertheless, it is worth noting
that zmax is unaffected by the level of capital gains taxation given by τg, because it
cancels out in equation (39).55
In the next step, we examine another interesting point in time, when the investor
knows that a late exit is as attractive as an immediate exit, i.e., when the present
52 i ∈ (0, 1), τ ∈ [0, 1), z ≥ 0.
53 See eq. (33).
54 See Kruschwitz and Löffler (2003) for similar problems with corporations that exist forever. Our
results also indicate that there is no optimum holding period; thus, holding forever is an attractive
option for the initial investor. This finding is in agreement with business valuation models that
determine a minimum price for the seller such that she or he is at least indifferent between selling
and holding. Only if the buyer bears the capital gains tax, i.e., pays the capital gains tax in addition
to the discounted cash flow value, the vendor will be willing to sell the company.
55 Furthermore, this result enables us to draw conclusions on the impact of transaction costs that so
far are disregarded in our setting. We could implement transaction costs in a plausible and simple
case into our model as a function of the capital gains and thus a multiplier to the capital gain,
similar to τg in equation (39). We will correspondingly find that zmax will remain unaffected.
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value for exits later than z = 0 reaches the present value for an exit at z = 0 again.
Only if late exits are at least as attractive as immediate sales will an investor hold
the investment. We define the exit time z = zg with zg ∈ [0, zmax], as the point in
time at which the present value in case of an exit at zg (Vτ0 [z = zg]) is equal to the
present value for an immediate exit at z = 0 (Vτ0 [z = 0]). Only for exit times later
than zg does an investment earn more than in the case of an immediate sale, and
it should thus be held for a minimum of zg periods. In figure 7, we illustrate zg as
the intersection of the present value in the cases of an immediate sale and a sale at zg .
Vτ0 I0φ
Figure 7: zmax and breakeven exit time zg depending on the time of sale z if φ > 1
If φ < 1,56 the investor realizes a capital loss at z = 0 and hence receives a tax
refund. This tax refund causes a global maximum value at z = 0. For later exit times
z > 0, this value Vτ0 [z = 0] cannot be reached again.
We concentrate on φ > 1 because it is the only case in which the present value is
greater than 1, and the investment is beneficial, compared to the financial investment.
We have φ > 1 if the income tax rate is greater than the corporate tax rate. This
relationship holds for all tax systems.57
We compare Vτ0 [z = 0] with Vτ0 [z = zg] to answer the question of the exit time z at
which the initial value at z = 0 can be reached again.
56 See figure 1. The investor realizes a capital loss at z = 0 under the classic corporate tax system and
shareholder relief tax system.
57 See Appendix.
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Vτ0 [z = 0] = Vτ0 [z = zg] (41)
I0 ·φ
(
1− βτg ·
(
1− 1
φ
))
= I0 ·φ ·
(
1− βτg ·
(1+ γiτc )zg − 1φ
(1+ iτ)zg
)
⇐⇒ 1− 1
φ
=
(1+ γiτc )zg − 1φ
(1+ iτ)zg
⇐⇒ 0 =
(1+ γiτc )zg − 1φ
(1+ iτ)zg +
1
φ
− 1.
For holdings with z > zg the investment will be better off than in the case of an
immediate sale. As already noted for zmax we see that zg is not affected by the capital
gains tax rate. Unfortunately, we could not find a method to determine analytically the
tangent zg from this equation. In contrast with the zmax-function, in equation (41), zg
exists at least for φ > 1. Hence, we can identify (beneficial) investments that generate
after-tax cash flows, which exceed the initial present value at z = 0 for later sales.
Nevertheless, to determine this point in time, we resort to a numerical approach.
4.5 Numerical Analysis
Because we cannot calculate zg analytically, we use Newton’s method to determine
the breakeven point zg. Recall that Newton’s method is an iterative scheme to com-
pute numerically the zero of an equation of the form f [x] = 0, given a differentiable
function f . 58
58 This function f determines some x∗ such that f [x∗] = 0 holds approximately in the following
way. Assume that the first derivative f ′[x] of f is given, and let x0 be an initial guess in some
neighborhood of the suspected zero x∗. Then, compute for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . the next iterates xk+1
by xk+1 = xk − f [xk]f ′[xk] . This iteration is terminated when the absolute error satisfies |f [xk+1]| <
10−8, which means that xk+1 is very close to the desired zero x∗. Alternatively, for our numerical
experiments, we performed at most 50 iterations, i.e., k = 0, . . . , 49. Here, the function f is the
right-hand side of the last identity in equation (41).
28
We assume the following parameters:
parameter value
I0 1
i 0.1
τc 0.4 (FI) and 0.25 (SR and CC)
τ 0.5
τg τ2 (FI and CC) and τ (SR)
Table 1: Data for the numerical example
In the following, we denote zg as a breakeven point. From this point of time, it is
beneficial for the investor to hold the investment.
The assumed tax rates are based on real-world tax rates.59 We assume an income
tax rate of τ = 0.5, according to the average marginal tax rate in Germany (1990-
2012).60 The capital gains tax rate is linked to the income tax rate. If the underlying
tax system requires a uniform income tax rate on dividends and interest (β = 1), we
set τg = τ2 . If the tax system is characterized by a preferential lower income tax rate
on dividends, we set β = 0.5 and τg = τ . Under all of the tax systems, capital gains
are assumed to be tax-exempt.
59 In the German full imputation tax system, the corporate tax rate from 1999 until 2000 was 40%.
Within the shareholder relief tax system, the corporate tax rate was 25%. We choose the same tax
rate for the classic corporate tax system.
60 The top marginal income tax rates in Germany were as follows: 1990-1999: 53%, 2005: 42% and
2012 45%. Considering the solidarity surcharge, it currently sums up to 0.475%
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Figure 8 displays zg as a result of the Newton iteration for the three tax systems
and different retention rates γ.
FI
SR
...... CC
Figure 8: Breakeven exit time zg depending on the retention rate γ
Figure 8 illustrates that, e.g., under the full imputation (shareholder relief) tax sys-
tem with a retention rate of γ = 0.2, the investment yields the present value given
for z = 0 after 66 (17) periods (years), while it takes 87 (47) periods (years) for a high
retention rate of γ = 0.6.61
If we assume that the investor strives to reach the breakeven point (zg) as quickly
as possible and that the preferred tax system depends on the profit distribution, the
development of the profit distribution is essential for the investor. Under full imputa-
tion and shareholder relief, Vτ0 can be realized for earlier exits at low retention rates.
By contrast, under the classic corporate tax system, we observe high retention rates
to stimulate an earlier breakeven point.62
To understand properly the mechanisms at work, we must separate the driving
forces. Interest, captured in the discount factor, is taxed equally under all three sys-
61 See also Protopapadakis (1983), who estimates average holdings periods of 21 to 34 years.
62 Under the classic corporate tax system for retention rates smaller than 0.4, a disadvantageous
present value emerges, which we exclude. See section 3.4.
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tems. The capital gains tax rate is the same under all three systems as well. The
difference is due to corporate taxation, dividend taxation and, thus, also to taxes that
have reduced accumulated capital gains, which will be tax-liable at sale.
Under the full imputation tax system, the capital gains tax burden exceeds taxes
on dividends.63 With an increasing retention rate, the present value decreases, and
the growth effect can only later be compensated for the discount effect. These effects
delay zg.
Under the shareholder relief tax system, dividends and capital gains are subject to
the same tax rate. Nevertheless, capital gains taxation occurs later, and multiple taxa-
tion of profits is likely to occur: both types of capital income are taxed at a corporate
tax rate of 25%. Dividends are subject to a capital income tax of 25% during the same
period. Capital gains are taxed at 25% at the time of sale z. Note that the capital gains
tax basis has been affected by the anticipated dividend tax of investor B. Capital gains
are therefore at a tax disadvantage, particularly for high retention rates. Thus, the
breakeven point, zg, is reached even later.
Under the classic corporate tax system, the tax burden for capital gains is smaller
than for dividends.64 This tax advantage leads to an increase in the present value for
increasing retention rates. Consequently, the breakeven point zg is reached earlier.
The temporary difference in zg is higher for small retention rates. This result is
consistent with our results for the worst exit time.65
We find that from the investor’s perspective, a change in the tax system, as well as in
the retention policy, affects the tax-optimal holding strategies. Under shareholder re-
lief, an early breakeven point results from a low retention rate, whereas low retention
rates cause a late breakeven point under a classic corporate tax system in countries
that have changed their tax systems from classic corporate taxation to shareholder
relief tax systems as, e.g., the Netherlands in 2001, the United States in 2003 and
63 The corporate taxation can be imputed only against the income tax on dividends.
64 Dividends are taxed without tax shield with a tax rate of 50%, and capital gains are taxed at a rate
of 25%.
65 To highlight the relevance of the assumed range of retention rates, we give an example. If we
look at the annual reports McDonald’s Corporation (2011) and McDonald’s Corporation (2013), we
find a retention ratio of, e.g., 24% in 2007, 57% in 2008 and 44% in 2013. Relating to the example
above, which is characterized by similar dividend rates, the holding period, which is necessary for
a beneficial investment, varies between 17 (shareholder relief tax system, γ = 0.2) and 113 (classic
corporate tax system, γ = 0.4) periods.
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Switzerland in 2007.66 These reforms emphasize the relevance of our findings. In
countries with such tax reforms, the breakeven exit time has changed dramatically in
the aftermath of reform.
To illustrate the influence of capital gains taxation in a different manner, figure 9
depicts the relative difference between the present values without and with capital
gains taxation (φ−V
τ
0
φ relative capital gains tax wedge) for an immediate exit at z = 0.
FI
SR
...... CC
Figure 9: Relative capital gains tax wedge φ−V
τ
0
φ for different tax systems and various retention
rates γ with τ = 0.5 and z = 0
Although this setting is stylized, the illustration of the present value with an exit
time in z = 0 enables us to abstract from the time effects of capital gains taxation,
e.g., the growth and discount effects. Here, we only capture the effects of capital gains
taxation independent of the exit time.
Obviously, the greatest difference occurs under the shareholder relief tax system;
i.e., the distortion of capital gains taxation is highest in this tax system. The differ-
ences in all of the tax systems increase with retention rates. This development is
due to the greater influence of capital gains taxation. The reason for this develop-
ment is the present value without capital gains taxation (φ). The higher that φ is,
the larger the distortion of capital gains taxation is. A closer consideration of the
66 See Becker et al. (2013), p. 6.
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value of φ is appropriate: From a tax perspective, φ is affected by income tax and
corporate tax. Retained earnings are most intensively taxed under a full imputation
tax system because a corporate tax rate of 40% is applicable, while the other systems
are characterized by a corporate tax rate of 25%. Dividends are most taxed under
the classic corporate tax system at a corporate tax rate of 25% and income tax rate
of 50%, without tax exemptions.67 Moderate taxation under shareholder relief leads
to the highest present value without capital gains, which is crucial to the maximum
deviation between the present value without and with capital gains taxation (φ−V
τ
0
φ ) in
a shareholder relief tax system.68
If examined at Vτ0 , capital gains are taxed differently in these three tax systems.
The steep slope of the classic corporate curve is remarkable, and the retention rate
for the classic corporate tax system is the most influential. In the classic corporate
tax system, capital gains taxation is most powerful. Here, capital gains are not tax
exempted, and the tax base is relatively high with regard to a corporate tax rate of
25%. The slope of the full imputation curve is flat. Indeed, capital gains are not tax
exempted, but the capital gains themselves are smallest relative to the high corporate
tax rate of 40%. The slope of the shareholder relief tax system is similar to the full
imputation tax system. In this system, capital gains are indeed higher than under full
imputation,69 but only half of the capital gains is taxed.
5 Conclusion
Because investments are often characterized by entry and exit flexibility, investors
must make decisions about both the investment and holding periods. Both decisions
are typically affected by corporate, income and capital gains taxation. Focusing on
investment in corporate shares, we investigate the impact of capital gains taxation
on the holding period under three different tax systems and thus how long investors
should hold their stocks.
67 By contrast, under a full imputation system, dividends are only subject to the income tax at 50%
and under shareholder relief to the corporate tax at a rate of 25%, and only half of the dividends
are subject to the income tax.
68 See figure 9.
69 Note that the corporate tax rate in the shareholder relief tax system is 25%.
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However, we find that there is no optimal holding period for a present value-
maximizing investor. We analytically derive a worst exit time that should be avoided
by investors, and we show that an immediate sell-off often is more attractive than a
short holding period. Nevertheless, if an investor wants to hold these stocks for a
longer period of time, she or he is well advised to wait until the breakeven exit time,
i.e., until the present value of an immediate sell-off can be recovered. We determine
the breakeven time, at which a late exit is as attractive as an immediate exit. Because
there is no analytical solution to the problem, we provide a numerical solution.
Our findings confirm the results in prior research that capital gains taxation is likely
to foster longer holdings (lock-in effect) and thereby to stimulate long-term invest-
ment. We find that capital gains taxation delays exit decisions, but the decision rel-
evance of capital gains taxation vanishes for very long holdings. Hence, our results
indicate that the capital gains tax lock-in effect is only temporary. Furthermore, we
show that the breakeven exit period crucially depends on the degree of income and
corporate tax integration. A classic corporate tax system often induces holdings over
more than 100 periods. Our results indicate that shareholder relief allows sharehold-
ers who aim for medium- or long-term investment horizons the earliest profitable
sales. Hence, shareholder relief provides the greatest degree of exit time flexibility
among the three underlying tax systems. Surprisingly, high retention rates are likely
to accelerate sales under the classic system. By contrast, under full imputation and
shareholder relief the required breakeven holding period increases with the retention
rate.
Furthermore, we clarify that the worst exit time differs considerably across the three
underlying tax systems if the retention rate is low. For an integrated tax system with
full imputation, it is reached earlier than under partial or non-integrated systems.
Although long-term investments often seem to be superior to short-term investments
from an investor’s post-tax, present value perspective, our study also emphasizes that
capital gains taxation often renders investments disadvantageous overall.
Our results are characterized by several limitations, for example, the focus on capi-
tal gains due to profit retention only. We abstract from other sources of capital gains,
such as speculative bubbles. Moreover, our findings are limited by the assumption
of uniform capital gains tax rates for short- and long-term capital gains. Under the
given set of assumptions, short-term investments become disadvantageous such that
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investors will refrain from them under all three tax systems. If we extend our model
and implement differentiating capital gains tax rates, short-term investments will be-
come even more unfavorable because they suffer from higher capital gains tax rates.
However, we cannot draw normative conclusions from this result. Our model does
not capture aspects that enable us to conclude that short-term investments are less
desirable (bad, i.e., speculative) for an economy than long-term (good, i.e., sound) in-
vestments, which in turn could justify such distortions.
Nevertheless, according to prior conclusions on the aggregate level, for example,
using a general equilibrium model, tax reformers must anticipate investors’ reactions
at the micro level. While tax politicians might prefer longer holdings to motivate
persistent investments, such a strategy might also be inefficient. Tax reformers must
be aware that the underlying tax system and the retention rate influence the breakeven
point and the worst exit time of investment significantly.
Hence, our results could help to predict investors’ behavior with regard to changes
in capital gains taxation, depending on the degree of corporate and income tax inte-
gration: thus, they will be interesting to both investors and tax policymakers. Our
findings provide a theoretical basis for empirical tests of the derived predictions of
holding behavior conditioned on the underlying tax system. Furthermore, they em-
phasize the need to control for the respective tax systems in cross-country empirical
studies.
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Appendix
For the full imputation tax system α = 0, β = 1. Hence we obtain70
φ > 1 (42)
⇔ (1− βτ)(1− γ)(1−ατ
c)
(1− τ)− γ(1− τc) > 1
⇔ (1− τ)(1− γ) > (1− τ)− γ(1− τc)
⇔ (1− τ)((1− γ)− 1) > −γ(1− τc).
As γ ≠ 0
1− τ < 1− τc
⇔ τ > τc .
Under the shareholder relief tax system α = 1, β = 0.5 and thus71
φ > 1 (43)
⇔ (1− 0.5τ)(1− γ)(1− τ
c)
(1− τ)− γ(1− τc) > 1
⇔ −0.5τ(1+ τ
c)− τc
0.5τ(1− τc) < γ.
Since γ < i
τ
iτc we obtain
−0.5τ(1+ τ
c)− τc
0.5τ(1− τc) <
(1− τ)i
(1− τc)i
⇔ −0.5τ − 0.5ττc + τc < 0.5τ − 0.5τ2
⇔ (−0.5τ + 1)τc < (−0.5τ + 1)τ2
⇔ τ > √τc ≥ τc .
From 0 ≤ τc < 1 follows
τ > τc .
70 See Sureth (2006), pp. 75ff., and Rupp (2012), p. 46.
71 See Sureth (2006), pp. 97ff., and Rupp (2012), p. 48.
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For the classic corporate tax system we have to set α = 1, β = 1 and get72
φ > 1 (44)
⇔ (1− βτ)(1− γ)(1−ατ
c)
(1− τ)− γ(1− τc) > 1
⇔ γ > τ
c(1− τ)
τ(1− τc) .
Given that γ < 1 we can write
1 >
τc(1− τ)
τ(1− τc) (45)
⇔ τ(1− τc) > τc(1− τ)
⇔ τ > τc .
72 See Rupp (2012), p. 52.
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